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Abstract—Software rarely works as intended when it is ini-
tially written. Things go wrong, and developers are commonly
understood to form theories and strategies to deal with them.
Much of this knowledge relates to ephemeral flaws rather than
reported bugs, and is not captured in the software record. As a
result, these flaws and understanding about them are neglected
in software engineering research. In this paper we describe
a study designed to elicit stories from software developers
about problems they encounter in their daily work. We also
offer preliminary thoughts about the utility of retrospective
interviewing in getting at information about ephemeral flaws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his paper Dependability: A Unifying Concept, Randell
noted that clarifying the concepts related to failure in soft-
ware engineering research is difficult. System boundaries
are fluid and artefacts are complex. Judgements about what
causes failure are subject to perception and attitudes, and
the mechanisms designed to prevent failures are themselves
failure-prone[1].
Given this, the concept of error is surprisingly stable in
the literature. It is described using different terms like fault,
defect or bug. However it is consistently taken to mean
those elements of software as written which threaten or
produce undesirable, unexpected and unintended deviation in
behavior[2]. Root-cause analysis is one area of software en-
gineering that has used this meaning to establish a research
model for analyzing the sources of errors in software.
Early on, authors of root-cause studies acknowledged
that the definition of error to which they worked was
simplified[3]. This compromise was seen as necessary to
produce measurable process improvement. In the intervening
years, however, researchers have struggled to adequately
or satisfactorily answer the question of why some errors
occur, limited by a definition of error that cannot account
for qualitative factors.
Our research reconsiders what errors in software are, de-
veloping a model that is human and historical. We acknowl-
edge that things that go wrong may result at some point in
faults within source-code[2], and thus leave evidence within
the software record. However our model accommodates the
fact that errors may also be ephemeral. They may exist only
as misunderstandings or miscommunications. They may go
wrong and be put right again before a release, commit,
or save. Thus, they may leave no clear (or indeed any)
representation within code, descriptions or project records.
The context and meaning associated with these kinds of
flaws are lost over time.
In the rest of this paper, we describe a study that explores
one method for researching this expanded notion of error.
II. WHY BOTHER AND WHERE TO LOOK
If they are put right or forgotten, why do things that go
wrong matter? A great deal of attention has been paid in
the past to finding ways to reduce the number of errors
in software. However there has not been corresponding
attention paid to existing practices that help to avoid their
accumulation in the first place. Similarly, though under-
standing and coordination are studied in the context of bug
fixing[4], the way they unfold at other points when things go
wrong is for the most part neglected1. As a result, software
engineering research misses opportunities to make software
”better”[6], and to help developers do better work.
The root-cause analyses examined make two sugges-
tions for additional research that support this view. The
first is that data about errors should be collected from
the entire development cycle, not just during testing and
integration[3][6], and should not be collected too long an
interval of time after events have passed[7]. The second is
that studies should be made that examine the causes of ”hu-
man erring”[3, p.331], including factors such as problems
of understanding[3], inexperience[8], lack of information[7],
and skill mismatch[9].
Unfortunately, though these papers offer clear ideas about
what to examine, they do not offer many suggestions for how
to go about doing it. They do, however, suggest likely chal-
lenges. To get around the fact that time erodes knowledge
about errors, Perry suggests that programmers be asked to
classify their errors as a part of closing modification and
bug reports [6], a technique found not to work particularly
well by Leszak et al.[9]. Organizational access is noted to
be difficult to attain when it requires sharing information
about mistakes[6], and management can seriously constrain
study design, in extreme cases resulting in retrospectively
gathered, anonymous self-reports[7].
1For a recent exception, see [5].
We used these points to formulate several premises for a
study designed to get a first look at ephemeral flaws. First,
we assumed that self-reports are not necessarily unreliable,
particularly if developers are permitted to recount experi-
ences in their own words[10]. Second, we acknowledged the
difficulty of gaining sufficient access to allow for detailed
observation of the origins, occurrences and outcomes of
things going wrong and compromised by seeking reports
about recent work. Third, in contrast to the root-cause
analyses, we assumed that bug reports are erroneous and
incomplete[4] in representing how work happens, and that
an understanding of error must look beyond these records.
A. The Critical Decision Method
With these assumptions in mind, the critical decision
method was selected for use, as described in Working Minds:
A Practitioner’s Guide to Cognitive Task Analysis[11]. Ap-
plied cognitive task analysis is intensive, requiring a good
understanding of cognition theory, and it is unclear at this
point to what extent the larger study of ephemeral flaws will
be able to apply it. Nevertheless, the guidelines provided for
conducting critical decision method interviews in this text
have served as a good introduction to eliciting retrospective
accounts of work.
The critical decision method was designed to understand
how people think in natural settings. It was developed to
address the fact that how people think in the workplace is
not well explained by the findings of experimental studies of
cognition. To this end, the critical decision method and other
techniques can be used to examine the functions associated
with an expanded range of cognitive phenomena that in-
cludes sensemaking, planning, coordination, adaptation, and
naturalistic decision making. In addition to illuminating how
people think on the job, the larger framework of cognitive
task analysis assists researchers in understanding expertise
in individual domains, by revealing the differences between
how experts and novices approach and manage their work.
III. METHOD
For this study, seven individuals were interviewed over
the course of four weeks. Participants perform a range of
software development tasks in an established U.K. digital
humanities center, described in 2008 by the Council on Li-
brary and Information Resources as an environment ”where
new media and technologies are used for humanities-based
research, teaching, and intellectual engagement and experi-
mentation. The goals of the center are to further humanities
scholarship, create new forms of knowledge, and explore
technology’s impact on humanities-based disciplines.”[12]
Development roles within this center tend to be fluid, with
employees responsible for multiple projects at a single time,
in a variety of capacities. In this study, all participants were
interviewed about an incident in which they played a discrete
role, in audio-recorded sessions that lasted from between
forty-five to seventy-five minutes.
Interviews were conducted by a single person, but other-
wise followed the basic procedures for conducting a critical
decision method interview. These entail examining a single
incident in four semi-structured ”sweeps”. In the first sweep,
the participant and the researcher identified an incident,
broadly defined as one having taken place in the previous
two weeks and in which the participant was a key decision
maker. In the second, a timeline was established to note criti-
cal decision points. In the third, deepening probes were used
to develop comprehensive and detailed understanding about
the incident. Though researchers often selectively use probes
at this stage to examine one or two cognitive phenomena,
this study made opportunistic use of a range of probes, with
an aim to identify in analysis those which are most effective
for learning about ephemeral flaws. Finally, the participant
was asked to consider hypothetical alternatives to decisions
taken.
Each interview concluded with questions about the par-
ticipant’s educational and professional background. Partici-
pants were asked to give the researcher copies of artefacts
mentioned in the discussion.
A. Validity
Given its exploratory aims and its focus on a single
organization and method of data collection, the results of
this study alone cannot make strong claims of validity. In
addition, it must be stated that the primary researcher had
prior understanding about the organizational culture in which
the participants work. However, this researcher had no direct
knowledge of any of the projects discussed.
IV. DISCUSSION
Analysis is in very early stages, and it is not possible
to report any conclusive findings. However, the interviews
did yield initial insights which resonate with findings in the
root-cause analyses. The stories collected suggest that the
”Why?” of some errors does, as Endres suggested, operate
on several levels, only some of them technical. They also
suggest that even bugs that are not critical, costly or difficult
do indeed possess ”rich” histories[4] that can be investigated
beyond the immediate details of the coordination and com-
munication efforts required to fix them.
A. ”Secret” bugs cannot be counted
In perhaps the most straightforward bit of evidence gath-
ered, one developer recounted the process of refactoring a
piece of software to consolidate and abstract functionality.
In the process of locating related code, he found and fixed
at least one small bug that had never been reported, and
which was not causing any known problems. This issue of
secret bugs was noted by Endres[3], and is accounted for by
Avizˇienis et al.[2] , but little evidence is documented in the
literature about what kinds of errors are found this way, and
what relation if any they bear to the larger task at hand at
the moment of their discovery.
B. Some causes do not make sense
In one case, a developer chose to discuss fixing a recently
reported bug. The fix was trivial, involving altering basic
conditional behavior in a single function. A root-cause anal-
ysis might have interpreted this as a novice programming
error, or more generously as one of those things that ”just
happens”. However the developer’s training and years of
experience suggested that the first explanation did not make
sense. The full story suggests that this bug also did not just
happen, but instead may have had origins several months
earlier, shaped by decisions related to open-source tech-
nology selection, the introduction of new communication
channels, and design choices taken to meet domain-specific
requirements.
C. Not every bug is a mistake
In another instance, an issue identified by a developer
surfaced as a bug several times over the course of nearly
two years, in open-source tools used by the developer and
in different areas of the software being developed. The issue
was related to the use of Unicode, which presented particular
complexities when introduced to the domain. Though the
programmer was well-versed in the technology, a solution
was not immediately apparent. However, rather than merely
signalling lack of knowledge as the root cause, this story
suggests that the developer actively managed the issue
over time, implementing incremental pragmatic solutions
as required to advance the larger program of work. This
strategy allowed him to explore the problem over time, and
ultimately to find the ”best” solution.
V. CONCLUSION
Ephemeral flaws are neglected in software engineering
research. Getting at them is difficult, in part because of their
nature: they are fleeting, not well documented, and poorly
accounted for by established models of software error.
The study reported here suggests a promising way to
develop understanding about how errors in software are
shaped by human effort and time. Retrospective interviewing
permits rich access to the people who make software, but
the data collected remains temporally removed from devel-
opment as it happens. Thus, the stories have the potential
to both benefit from hindsight and suffer the passage of
time. In addition, the basic method employed in this study
resulted in accounts of small, quickly resolved issues and
others of persistent issues that stretched across many months.
This method is being refined for future interviews to target
particular timeslices and activities. Other techniques are
being investigated to allow us to get at ephemeral flaws as
they are being experienced.
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